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THE ABORIGINAL RIGHT TO A COMMERCIAL FISHERY 
STUART GILBYt 
This paper explores the issue of an Aboriginal right to a commercial 
fishery in Canada. Relevant case law and government policy are ex-
amined. 
Historically, governments have excluded the First Nations from 
participation in the political and economic life of the country, with 
devastating results. 1 These problems continue to plague Aboriginal 
peoples in their dealings with the rest of Canada. 
Traditionally, the courts have supported this exclusion. The 
justice system has been utilised to ensure the success of programs 
that dominate and marginalize Native peoples. 2 
t LLB. anticipated in 1995. 
1 The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, The Path to Healing: Report of 
the National Roundtable on Aboriginal Health and Social Issues (Ottawa: Canada 
Communications Group, 1993) at 29: 
the pre-contact Aboriginal population of Canada [was] 210,000 
dropping to 80,000 in 1870 and recovering to 120,000 in the 
early 1900s. 
Andat 91: 
Indigenous groups epitomized the state of human health and 
environmental harmony, with sophisticated systems of kinship 
and exacting medicinal practices. But with the encroachment of 
Euro-American influence, captivity and dysfunction resulted. 
Captivity is a complex web of geographic, economic, and legal 
isolation that significantly segregates Indigenous peoples so that 
they cannot benefit from the range and quantity of human 
resources enjoyed by other Canadians. Dysfunction is nowhere 
more evident than in the health status ofindigenous peoples. 
2 R. A. Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990) at 325. 
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In a series of seminal cases beginning with Calder v. British 
Columbia (A.G.) 3 and culminating in R. v. Sparrow,4 the Supreme 
Court of Canada has moved away from precedent based on racial 
bias and contempt for values that are in conflict with European 
ideas of property and rights.5 
Several lower court judges have used these Supreme Court 
cases, and the new concepts they entail, to broaden the law's under-
standing of what constitutes Aboriginal rights. The judgments of 
Lambert J.A. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal are prime 
examples of carefully considered applications of these new princi-
ples. 
This paper concludes that there is a moral and legal duty for the 
rest of the country to recognize, and facilitate the exercise of, an 
Aboriginal right to a commercial fishery. 
3 [1973] S.C.R. 313, 4 W.W.R. 1 [hereinafter Calder cited to S.C.R.]. 
4 [1990] l S.C.R. 1075, 4 W.W.R. 410 [hereinafter Sparrow cited to S.C.R.]. See 
also: R. v. Guerin, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 6 W.W.R. 481; R. v. Simon, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 
387, 71 N.S.R. (2d) 15 [hereinafter Simon]; R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025. 
5 Eurocentric jurisprudence has built upon the racist premises inherent in 
theories of primitivism and the doctrines of Terra Nullius, Discovery, and 
Conquest. Traditional Canadian legal theory on Aboriginal rights is founded upon 
The Royal Proclamation of 1763; treaties dating from 1725; the U.S. cases: Johnson 
and Graham Lesees v. Macintosh (1823), 21 U.S. (Wheaton) 543 (S.C.), The 
Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia (1831), 30 U.S. 1 (S.C.), Worcester v. The 
State of Georgia (1832), 31 U.S. (6 Peters) 515 (S.C.); and Saint Catherine's Lumber 
and Milling Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14A.C. 46 (P.C.). 
Of particular note is the racism that supported the views of Marshall C.J. of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the cases listed above. In denying full and equal rights to 
First Nations he said in Johnson at 590: 
But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce 
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was 
drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of 
their country, was to leave the country a wilderness .... 
The first statement seems at best incongruous. Surely it is Europeans who 
continue to exhibit a lust for war: the horrific mess in the Balkans attests to that fact. 
The second statement blithely ignores the agricultural societies established by a 
variery of indigenous groups in the Americas. The third underlines the conceptual 
problems that have brought the environment to its present precarious state. The 
combination is a poor foundation for establishing equitable jurisprudence. 
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I. SPARROW 
The decision in R. v. Sparrow 6 is the most important yet from the 
Supreme Court of Canada on Aboriginal rights and the fishery. It is 
also a major pronouncement on, and interpretation of, the consti-
tutionality of all rights of the First Nations. 
Mr. Sparrow was charged under the Regulations of the Fisheries 
Act7 for fishing with a drift net longer than was permitted under the 
Musqueam Band's Food Fishing Licence, issued by the Department 
of Fisheries and Oceans. He claimed that his right to fish was 
protected by subsection 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, 8 and 
that since the licence regulations were inconsistent with this 
protection, they were of no force or effect under section 52. 
Essentially, the Crown's position was that the right had been 
extinguished by regulation. 
Counsel for Mr. Sparrow argued before the Supreme Court that 
the issue should be viewed as one of a right to a commercial fish-
ery.9 The Court said that it felt constrained to decide the matter 
only as it had been presented to the lower courts-as one relating 
solely to the food fishery. 10 It is obvious that the Court side-
stepped the commercial fishery issue in order to force Indigenous 
groups and the Government to resolve the issue outside of the ju-
dicial system. 
The judgment implicitly warns both sides that having the court 
make such a decision may result in extreme disappointment. The 
greater warning is aimed at the Government. This unanimous ruling 
increases the scope of the fiduciary duty under which the Crown 
must operate when dealing with First Nations peoples. It is plain 
that the Court expects the Government to perform in an honourable 
manner and to respect the inherent rights of Natives. 
For the first time, the court addressed the scope of subsection 
35(1), which states: "The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed." 
The decision first looks at the meaning of "existing" and deter-
mines that the rights involved are those in existence at the time that 
6 Supra note 4. 
7 R.S.C. 1970, c. F.-14, s. 61(1). 
8 Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), c. 11. 
9 W. I. C. Binnie, "The Sparrow Doctrine: Beginning of the End or End of the 
Beginning?" 15 Queen's L.J. 217 at 219. 
10 Supra note 4 at llOO. 
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the Act came into effect. Rights previously extinguished in a valid 
manner are not revived, but "an existing aboriginal right cannot be 
read so as to incorporate the specific manner in which it was regu-
lated before 1982." To do so would be to constitutionalise "a crazy 
patchwork of regulations." 11 
Aboriginal rights are not to be frozen in time but are to be in-
terpreted in a flexible manner "so as to permit their evolution" and 
are to be viewed in their "contemporary form rather than in their 
simplicity and vigour"(emphasis added). 12 
The Crown's argument that the Fisheries Act and Regulations 
constituted a complete code adverse to the existence of Aboriginal 
rights is firmly rejected. The Court found that a controlled right is 
not one which is extinguished. 13 In a passage that dismisses the 
application of pre-1982 jurisprudence and its belief that extin-
guishment by statute was readily accomplished, the judgment 
adopts the words of Hall J. from Calder, that any statutory intent 
to extinguish must be clear and plain. Dickson C.J. says that the 
Fisheries Act and Regulations have no such intent. 14 
The Court interpreted the phrase "recognized and affirmed" 
found in subsection 3 5 ( 1). The Bench clearly limits the concept of 
Aboriginal rights when finding that "there was from the outset 
never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed 
the underlying title, to such lands vested in the Crown." 1 5 
Obviously, in the Court's opinion, Aboriginal rights or claims to 
land are not absolute. 
This admonition is followed by a passage detailing how the de-
cision in Calder caused a major shift in the negotiating policy of the 
Government. This in turn resulted in subsection 35(1) being en-
shrined in the Constitution. The latter point is seen as putting an 
end to "the old rules of the game" and "calls for a just settlement 
for aboriginal peoples." 16 
Subsection 35(1) is to be construed purposively and "a gener-
ous, liberal interpretation of the words in the constitutional provi-
11 Supra note 4 at 1091. 
12 Ibid. at 1093. The Court quotes with approval B. Slattery, "Understanding 
Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 782. 
13 Ibid. at 1097. 
14 Ibid. at 1099. 
15 Ibid. at 1103. 
16Ibid. at 1106. The Court quotes N. Lyon, "An Essay on Constitutional 
Interpretation" (1988), 26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 95 at 100. 
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sion is demanded." 17 This results in an extension of the meaning 
and application of the concept of fiduciary duty. This duty is held 
to be incumbent upon the Crown in its dealings with indigenous 
peoples. A great deal of pressure is placed on the Crown by the 
Court: 
the Government has the responsibility to act in a fidu-
ciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples. The re-
lationship between the Government and the aboriginals is 
trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary 
recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must be 
defined in light of this historic relationship ... the hon-
our of the Crown is at stake in dealing with aboriginal 
peoples. The special trust relationship and the responsi-
bility of the government vis-a-vis aboriginal peoples must 
be the first consideration in determining whether the 
legislation or action in question can be justified. 18 
There will be a great deal of difficulty for the legislative, executive, 
and administrative arms of Government to be successful before the 
Court unless they formulate new approaches in their dealings with 
Natives. This is made evident by statements to the effect that 
"federal power must be reconciled with federal duty" and that the 
Crown will be held "to a high standard of honourable dealing with 
respect to the aboriginal peoples."19 
The decision ends the application of the Derricksan 20 line of 
cases which had established that Aboriginal fishing rights were sub-
ject to regulation and consequent extinguishment. 
Although subsection 3 5 ( 1) is outside the Charter and beyond 
the reach of section 1 limitations, the Court develops an Oakes-
like 21 test to emphasize that Aboriginal rights are not absolute and 
can be regulated. This test is to be administered on a case-by-case 
basis and is meant to be applied rigorously when the Court scruti-
nizes legislation for compliance with the Constitution.22 
17 Ibid. at 1108. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. at 1109. 
20 R. v. Derricksan (1976), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 159, [1976) 6 W.W.R. 480 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter Derricksan]. 
21 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 138-39, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200 [hereinafter 
Oakes cited to S.C.R.]. 
22 As it was fashioned in the same vein as Oakes, it may be that it too will steadily 
be eroded. The Court has come under increasing pressure to defer to Parliament on 
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The Sparrow Test 
There is an onus of proof on an indigenous group or individual 
claiming infringement of a fishing right to demonstrate that indeed 
the practice is an existing right under subsection 35(1). This right is 
not to be ascertained from the traditional European property view-
point. Aboriginal fishing rights are collective rights and in keeping 
with earlier Court decisions are deemed sui generis. The courts are 
"to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective."23 
In order to determine if there has been a prima facie infringe-
ment of a right, the courts are to ask: 
First, is the limitation unreasonable? Secondly does the 
regulation impose undue hardship? Thirdly, does the 
regulation deny to the holders of the right their preferred 
means of exercising that right?24 
Once the above-noted steps have been proved by the claimant alleg-
ing legislative infringement, the onus shifts to the Crown. 
The issue of justification is then to be addressed. The 
Government is to show that the impugned legislation has a valid 
objective. While not exploring this issue in great detail and leaving 
the concept to be explored in each subsequent case, the Court ac-
cepts that conservation is indeed a valid objective but rejects the 
"public interest" argument as being too vague to deny a constitu-
tional right. 
Once a valid objective has been established, focus moves to the 
conduct of the Crown in implementing its purpose. Again, the 
Court goes to great lengths to lay out the need for the Government 
to fulfil its fiduciary obligation and act in an honourable manner. A 
non-exhaustive list of indicia by which to measure Government ac-
tion is given. Three points are brought out here: 
1. Does the legislation impair the right as minimally as possi-
ble? 
many issues and no longer rigorously upholds Oakes. For a discussion of the 
Court's retreat from its early assertion of Charter rights see D. Gibson, "The 
Deferential Trojan Horse: A Decade of Charter Decisions" (1993) 72 Can. Bar 
Rev. 417. 
23 Supra note 4 at 1112. 
24 Ibid. The third question implies recognition of an ability to exercise the right 
in a commercial fashion. 
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2. If there has been expropriation of the right, was fair com-
pensation offered? 
3. Has the Aboriginal group in question been consulted prior 
to implementation of the regulation or legislation? 
If positive answers to these or similar questions can be found then 
the limitation of the right may be upheld. 
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that Aboriginal rights are 
not considered absolute and may be subject to control. However, 
the court places much greater emphasis on the Government's need 
to fulfil its special obligations and to act honourably. 
II. THE RESPONSE TO SPARROW 
In the wake of this case much activity was undertaken at the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans CDFO) to reorganize its deal-
ings with Natives. A policy paper on the "Aboriginal Fisheries 
Strategy" 25 CAPS) was published and accompanied by a series of 
initiatives including establishment of: 
1. Aboriginal Fishing Agreements, or contracts, between the 
Ministry and Indigenous groups; 
2. Aboriginal Fishing Authorities which are Native-run bureau-
cratic bodies given management responsibilities by DFO; 
3. Communal Licences which dictate the terms and methods 
of implementation of fishing activities; 
4. A few pilot commercial projects, for the most part under-
taken on the Pacific coast; and 
5. Contribution Agreements which fund bands who join with 
DFO in fishery management plans. 
The policy is patronizing, and for all its purported claims of ne-
gotiation, still manages to dictate ultimatums. It is possible to char-
acterize this entire process as another carrot-and-stick approach 
used to obtain native compliance with Government strategy. The 
stick is to be wielded when agreement cannot be reached on a man-
agement plan. DFO will issue a Communal Licence on its last of-
25 Department of Fisheries and Oceans, "Policy for the Management of 
Aboriginal Fishing" (Ottawa: Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 1991). 
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fered terms.26 Those in violation of the licence are subject to pros-
ecution. 
The Contribution Agreement is, of course, the carrot. For cash-
starved bands that have experienced decades of astronomical levels 
of unemployment, the offer of a large sum of money is a com-
pelling method of obtaining "agreement" with DFO programs. 
Rather than engender self-sufficiency this exercise only serves to ex-
tend the shadow of Government financial control through yet an-
other social welfare program. 
Nonetheless, there are some promising aspects to the undertak-
ing. These include the development of joint conservation strategies 
and habitat enhancement programs through the Contribution 
Agreements and commercial pilot projects such as those in Quebec 
and British Columbia. These are operated by bands in conjunction 
with Indian Affairs and DF0. 27 For example, at Waswanipi, Quebec, 
DFO is working with the local Cree to establish commercial markets 
in Montreal for Jam es Bay area whitefish, sturgeon and pickerel. 28 
1. The West Coast 
The Pacific commercial fishery was estimated in 1989 as having an 
annual gross income of $500,000,000. 29 There has been Native 
participation in this fishery for some time. This participation has 
generally been on the open market and not tied to Aboriginal 
rights. The Native Brotherhood of British Columbia represents 
some 1500 indigenous workers involved in the industry. In 1985 it 
created the Native Fishing Association (NFA) to help finance 
Aboriginal groups and individuals attempting to enter the com-
mercial system. 
Both of these groups have worked in concert with a non-Native 
organisation, the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union 
(UFAWU), on items of mutual interest. Occasional differences have 
arisen in the past over such things as the 1989 strike by the UFAwu. 30 
26 Ibid. at 2, 4. 
27 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INACl, "Annual Report 1990-1991" 
(Ottawa), states at 24 that 21 different projects were established in British 
Columbia alone, to which INAC contributed $630,000. 
28 Information provided by B. Craik, Director of Federal Relations-Grand 
Council of the Crees of Quebec, in a telephone conversation in March of 1994. 
29 Canadian Press (Vancouver) (3 August 1989) (QL). 
3o Ibid. 
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The Government's response to Sparrow has resulted in greater 
open discord between Natives and other fishers on the west coast. 
In 1991, the NFA called for thirty percent of all commercial licences 
in British Columbia to be awarded to Aboriginals in an attempt to 
take control of a reasonable share of the market. Unfortunately, 
non-Indigenous organizations have expressed alarm at both the AFS 
and many NFA proposals, seeing them as a threat to the status quo.3 1 
This acrimony is just as often an extension of long held 
misunderstandings, xenophobia, and racism, as it is a fear of losing 
economic security. These attitudes constitute a serious problem 
across the entire country and threats of violence are becoming more 
common.32 
2. Atlantic Canada 
In the Maritimes, the Mi'kmaq have attempted to explain their 
view of history, the environment, the fishery, and the law, in a 
booldet entitled "Netukulimk."33 Much of their position is based on 
the sanctity of treaties concluded with the British between 1725 
and 1761: 
All the treaties confirm the right of the Mi'kmaq to fish. The 
right to fish is one of many understandings forming the basis of 
the Treaty language. The Mi'kmaq over all of present-day Nova 
Scotia, including Cape Breton Island, signed treaties with the 
British. The Mi'kmaq today living throughout the Traditional 
Territory are the beneficiaries of these Treaties. As a result, the 
Mi'kmaq in Atlantic Canada continue to have the free liberty or 
3I On January 29, 1993, the Pacific Blackcod Fisherman's Association issued a 
statement that it intended to sue DFO, its Minister, Deputy Minister, and Regional 
director over AFS plans to increase Indigenous peoples' participation in the 
blackcod fishery. One of the grounds alleged by the BFA was that Aboriginals had 
never participated in this fishery and therefore should be precluded from asserting 
any right to enter the current system. Canadian Press (Vancouver) (29, January 
1993) (QL). 
32 Nova Scotia lobster fisherman Wayne Spinney told Fisheries Minister Brain 
Tobin: 
There are thousands of pounds of lobster being brought in 
illegally under the guise of the native fishery. Is it to be settled 
amongst ourselves by yelling and fighting and eventually guns 
and so on? 
Canadian Press (Yarmouth) (17 March 1993) (QL). 
33 Native Council of Nova Scotia, Mi'kmaq Fisheries, Netukulimk, Towards a 
Better Understanding (Truro: 1993). 
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right to fish, and sell fish as protected through the Covenant 
Chain ofTreaties (emphasis added).34 
The Mi'kmaq also place great faith in a series of liberal court deci-
sions. For example, they have this to say of the decision handed 
down by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in R. v. Denny:35 
The Court has clarified that the Mi'kmaq of Nova 
Scotia, both on Cape Breton Island and the mainland, 
possess an aboriginal right to fish for food for themselves 
and their families, independent of any treaty-based right, 
both on reserve and off reserve. This right to take fish takes 
priority over the interests of recreational and commercial 
fisherman(emphasis in the original).36 
The official Mi'kmaq position concerning access to the com-
mercial fishery espoused in this booklet is one of quiet determina-
tion. The Mi'kmaq affirm that such rights are guaranteed both as 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights in law. In addition, they claim com-
mitment to a path of negotiation in an attempt to fully realize the 
potential that these rights hold. The booklet also provides a de-
tailed list of the Mi'kmaq cooperative efforts with DFO and the 
Maritime Fisherman's U nion.37 
However, there is evidence that if the pace of change is too 
slow, unilateral action will be taken. Donald Marshall has been 
charged with commercially fishing eels without a licence. The case 
is currently before the Provincial Court and evidence is not freely 
available. Apparently, he was offered a licence and refused it. The 
defence is predominantly based on the guarantees in the Treaty of 
1752, that those taking its benefit 
have free liberty of hunting and fishing as usual ... [and] 
shall have complete freedom to bring for Sale to Halifax 
or any other Settlement ... fish, or any other thing they 
shall have to sell, where they shall have liberty to dispose 
thereof to the best advantage.38 
34 Ibid. at 11. 
35 (1990), 94 N.S.R. (2d) 253 (N.S.C.A.). The reasoning in this case was approved 
by the Supreme Court in Sparrow. 
36 Supra note 33 at 17. 
37 Ibid. at 54. 
38 Treaty of 1752, Article 4. There are also available defences related to 
subsequent treaties in the 1760s and an Aboriginal right to a commercial fishery as 
discussed in this paper. 
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Several other cases in the Atlantic Region awaiting trial deal 
with Fisheries Act violations and relate to defences of Aboriginal and 
Treaty rights. Mi'kmaq, Metis and non-Aboriginal persons are in-
volved in a variety of situations. Some of these may be pre-deter-
mined by cases currently under appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
III. CASES SUBSEQUENT TO SPARROW 
1. British Columbia 
In 1993, a series of cases split the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
over the issue of Aboriginal food and commercial fishing rights. 
The majority and minority opinions displayed fundamentally op-
posing views of what constitutes an Aboriginal right and how that 
right may be legally exercised.39 At this writing they are yet to be 
heard by the Supreme Court. 
The future of more than the west coast fishery will hang in the 
balance. There is, of course, no guarantee that the indigenous peo-
ples involved, if unsatisfied with the Supreme Court's decision, 
would not seek other avenues of resolution. These might include 
anything from appeals to the international community through the 
United Nations to civil disobedience and armed hostility. Younger 
members of the Aboriginal community, frustrated with their situa-
tion, are prepared to increase the level of confrontation first seen at 
Oka.40 
A case of immense complexity and importance, Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia, 41 concerns land claims and Aboriginal rights. The 
majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal seems to be 
caught in an outdated and narrow interpretation of what constitutes 
aboriginal rights and how they may be exercised. MacFarlane J.A. 
states: 
A practice which had not been integral to the organized 
society and its distinctive culture, but which became 
39 March 11, 1994 (QL). 
4o See G. York & L. Pindera, People of the Pines: The Warriors and the Legacy of 
Oka (Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1991). 
4l [1993] 5 W.W.R. 97 (B.C.C.A.). This case has been given leave by the Supreme 
Court to wait the outcome of land claims negotiations between the Gitskan and the 
Province of British Columbia prior to being heard. 
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prevalent as a result of European influences would not 
qualify for protection as an aboriginal right.42 
He continues, "aboriginal rights are fact and site specific," any 
rights are to be determined by actual occupancy and use of specific 
areas of land. "Activities may be regarded as aboriginal if they 
formed an integral part of traditional Indian life prior to 
sovereignty" (emphasis added).43 
Much of this view is based on the decision in Hamlet of Baker 
Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 44 a 
judgment that determined Aboriginal rights in a restrictive manner. 
It received criticism from the Supreme Court in Ontario (A.G.) v. 
Bear Island Foundation. 45 
In summation, the British Columbia Court of Appeal lays out a 
three-part test of what it considers are relevant facts to prove the 
existence of an Aboriginal right. The right must be integral to the 
group in question. It must have been exercised for a sufficient 
length of time prior to, and at the assertion of, British sovereignty 
(in 1846 according to the Court).46 The right must have been un-
extinguished as of 1982 in order to enjoy constitutional protection. 
With the exception of the last point, this definition is contrary to 
the spirit of the Sparrow judgment. 
Lambert J.A., dissenting, held a much broader view of the con-
cept of Aboriginal rights, one that is in keeping with Simon, 
Sparrow, and section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. It is also in-
novative and refreshing in the arid desert of formalistic legal think-
ing that continues to be the foundation for many judgments con-
cerning indigenous peoples. He asserts that Aboriginal rights must 
be characterized in terms of Aboriginal society and not, as has been 
42 Ibid. at 125. 
43 Ibid. at 129. 
44 (1979), 107 D.L.R. (3d) 513 (F.C.T.D.). The case sets out a four-part test 
which must be met to ensure the success of an aboriginal title claim: 1) The 
claimants and their ancestors are to be an organized society; 2) that society is to have 
occupied the specific area over which the claim is made; 3) occupation was to the 
exclusion of others, and; 4) occupation was an established fact at the time of the 
assertion of British sovereignty. 
45 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 570 at 575, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 381 at 384. The Court implies 
that the test in Baker Lake is overly restrictive and says that it prefers the tests it used 
in Simon and Sparrow. 
46 Supra note 41 at 177. 
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too often the case, solely in European terms.47 He outlines six 
considerations that may be of help in determining what comprises 
an Aboriginal right.48 
First, the constitutional guarantee of section 35 is not to be seen 
as attempting to protect the rights of indigenous peoples as they 
were at the time of assertion of British sovereignty. Like other con-
stitutional rights, they must evolve or grow over time but without 
further erosion. 
Second, rights not habits are protected. These rights must be 
considered fundamental, significant, and distinctive by the group 
claiming them. Lambert adopts the phrase "an integral part of their 
distinctive culture" from Sparrow to illustrate the concept. 
Third, Natives enjoy all of the same rights as other Canadians 
with Aboriginal rights being held in addition to these common 
freedoms. These additional rights are part of the common law and 
arise from "aboriginal occupation, possession, use and enjoyment of 
land, through the institutions of aboriginal society." 
Fourth, the existing rights as constitutionalised are contemporary 
rights capable of exercise in a modern way. "They are not to be 
frozen at the time of Sovereignty or any other time." 
Fifth, if the right is an "encompassing and general right" it is 
not to be defined by the particular method of its exercise. An ex-
ample is given that a right of exclusive occupation, possession, and 
use of the land allows a group to establish a landfill site. That activ-
ity would not derive from a limited, modernized concept of the 
right to erect a midden. 
Finally, if the Aboriginal society had recognized collective, 
small-group, or individual rights, those must be recognized today. 
There can be no blanket imposition of the idea that only collective 
rights apply to Natives. 
These conceptual differences between Lambert J .A. and the 
majority of the court are highlighted in R. v. Vanderpeet, 49 wherein 
a member of the Sto:lo nation was charged with selling salmon 
caught under the authority of a Food Fishing Licence. The 
majority held that the relevant method of determining the scope of 
a right to fish was to examine the nature of the right as it existed 
prior to contact with Europeans. The fact that on contact the Sto:lo 
47 Ibid. at 277. 
48 Ibid. at 277-81. 
49 [1993] 5 W.W.R. 459 (B.C.C.A.). 
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had freely begun to barter in fish was deemed not to be a natural 
progression of an aboriginal right. Mrs. Van der Peet was held not 
to have a defence of exercising an Aboriginal right in answer to the 
charge. 50 
In dissent, Lambert J .A. writes that the key to understanding 
Aboriginal rights is in correctly defining them. He finds at least 
three ways of relating the salmon fishery to Sto:lo customs, tradi-
tions, and practices.5 1 
First, he looks at the purpose of the salmon fishery. If that pur-
pose is solely to obtain food then the right should be so limited. 
Secondly, the court may adopt as applicable any limitation placed 
by the Sto:lo on the exercise of the custom of fishing. Finally, it is 
proper to look at the overall importance of the practice in the lives 
of the people involved. 
This third "social" interpretation will give the superior interpre-
tation of the right from the perspective of both an Aboriginal group 
and the common law, Lambert J .A. says. He finds that the salmon 
were central to the lives of the Sto:lo. Early trade with the Hudson 
Bay Company clearly depicts the scope of the right as seen by them 
and offers a basis for the validity of a claim to a commercial fishery. 
Mrs. Van der Peet was therefore exercising an unextinguished 
Aboriginal right and she has a sound defence to the charge.52 
In R. v. Gladstone,53 members of the Heiltsuk band were 
charged with attempting to sell herring spawn without a licence. 
The majority of the Court held that the nature and scope of the 
Aboriginal right did not include the right to sell spawn. In the al-
ternative, they said any prima facie infringement of such a right by 
the licensing scheme was justified by the need for conservation.54 
Lambert J.A. found that the evidence supported a claim to a 
commercial fishing right. The Heiltsuk had traditionally engaged 
in trading herring spawn with other Natives prior to the arrival of 
Europeans. Historical data and anthropological studies were exam-
ined in support of the claim. The only limitation to which this right 
was subject was that of a potential need for conservation. Lambert 
50 Ibid at 468-74. 
51 Ibid at 495-504. 
52 Ibid at 506-11. 
53 [1993] 5 W.W.R. 517 (B.C.C.A.). 
54 Ibid at 528-30. 
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].A. found that the evidence did not support a conclusion that con-
servation was needed.55 
R. v. NT. C. Smokehouse 56 involved a corporate entity of the 
Sheshaht and Optechesaht bands. It was accused of buying fish not 
lawfully caught under a commercial licence, and also of selling fish 
caught under an Indian Food Fishing Licence. The majority found 
that there was no validity to a claim of an Aboriginal right to a 
commercial fishery as, historically, the bands were not established 
as barterers or sellers of fish. Moreover, they said that the imposi-
tion of the licensing scheme was for the benefit of the resource and 
was a necessary infringement of any rights.57 
Justice Lambert found that the trial judge had erred in conclud-
ing that there was no commercial fishery right held by the band. As 
the group had such a right, it was evident that the licensing and 
regulating scheme were a prima facie infringement of that right as 
per Sparrow, and a prohibition on sale of fish could not be justified 
for conservation purposes given the state of the particular fishery.5 8 
R. v. Nikal 59 does not specifically deal with commercial fishing 
but the reasons given by Lambert J .A., again in the minority, offer 
an excellent understanding of the relationship between the Sparrow 
test and the imposition of licensing and regulating schemes. 
In 1986, Mr. Nikal, a member of the Gitskan-Wet'suwet'en, 
was accused of fishing without a DFO Indian Food Fishing Licence 
(he was in possession of a licence issued under band by-laws). He 
was acquitted at trial in Provincial Court. The trial judge declared 
the band licence offered a complete defence to the charge. The 
Crown appealed and, at summary appeal court, the acquittal was 
upheld on the alternate ground that the Fisheries regulation consti-
tuted a prima facie infringement of Mr. Nikal's right to fish for 
food and was not justified. 
Justice Lambert agreed that the imposition of the DFO licensing 
scheme constituted a prima facie infringement under the Sparrow 
test. He declared that in order for the resource to be adequately 
maintained one single authority should control the entire system, 
including the river and the sea. This entity would need to consult 
55 Ibid. at 532-41. 
56 [1993] 5 W.W.R. 542 (B.C.C.A.). 
57 Ibid. at 555-61. 
58 Ibid. at 587-97. Note especially the comments at 593. 
59 [1993] 5 W.W.R. 629 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter 
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with all resource users and might involve developing a licensing sys-
tem. In 1986, the regulating scheme did not recognize any right to 
the fishery for Aboriginals other than for food. This limited recog-
nition did not even allow barter of fish for other food to ensure a 
balanced diet. Go 
At the time the Gitskan-Wet'suwet'en were in the process of 
launching their land claim and were not prepared to submit to the 
licensing process. The Crown was convinced that any Native accep-
tance of the regulating scheme indicated that Aboriginal rights had 
been abandoned. 
As the parties were at polar opposites on the licensing program, 
the manner of implementing the scheme was found by Lambert 
].A. to be contrary to the minimum impairment principles enunci-
ated in Sparrow. The majority allowed the Crown's appeal and re-
versed the acquittal, holding that the impugned scheme was not a 
prima facie infringement of Aboriginal rights nor did it cause undue 
hardship. It was also stated that band regulation of a fishery can 
only be valid if authority is delegated by Parliament.61 
2. Quebec 
The Quebec Court of Appeal holds views similar to the majority of 
the British Columbia Court in Nikal. In R. v. Deconti,62 five mem-
bers of the Desert River Algonquin band were charged with fishing 
without a licence as required under subsection 4(1) of the Quebec 
Fisheries Regulations. 63 They claimed an Aboriginal right protected 
by subsection 35(1) of the Constitution. In addition, they asserted 
a right protected by the Treaty of Swegatchy and section 88 of the 
Indian Act, 64 which allowed them to hunt and fish in traditional 
territory without being subject to Government regulation. The 
Court of Appeal agreed that the Treaty gave a right to fish and 
hunt in the territory, but the Government demand for a licence did 
not constitute an undue hardship on those rights. The accused have 
been granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.65 
Go Ibid. at 663. 
61 Ibid at 639-43. 
62 [1993] A.Q No. 846 (QL). 
63 (1978) 115 G.O.C. II, 2561. 
64 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s.88. 
65 Leave granted (3 March 1994) S.C.C.A. (QL). 
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3. Ontario 
Two cases highlight the effect that Sparrow has had on treaty rights 
and their interpretation by the courts. R. v. Bombay 66 dealt with 
members of the Rainy River band of the Saulteaux Tribe of the 
Ojibway Nation, Treaty Number 3, and the Fisheries Act. The ac-
cused were charged with fishing out of season, fishing with a pro-
hibited net, and selling fish out of season. They claimed a treaty 
right to a commercial fishery. At trial, the judge found that a treaty 
right to a commercial fishery did exist but that it was subject to 
regulation. The case was decided prior to Sparrow. The appeal was 
heard following that judgment. 
At the Court of Appeal a unanimous bench held that the 
Sparrow principles apply to Treaty rights. Consequently, the Court 
found that the restrictions interfered with the preferred method of 
exercising the right and caused an undue hardship. The Crown did 
not argue that the Government could justify its regulation as de-
manded by Sparrow. The appeal was allowed and the convictions 
quashed. 
R. v. Jones and Nadjiwon 67 dealt with members of the 
Chippewas of Nawash who are part of the Saugeen Ojibway 
Nation, the Bondhead Treaty of 1836, and the Fisheries Act. The ac-
cused were charged with taking and selling more fish than allowed 
under their commercial licence quota. The evidence established that 
the band had both an Aboriginal and Treaty right to fish for com-
mercial purposes. This right was of vital importance to the eco-
nomic needs of this group.68 
The Crown submitted that the Ojibway were seeking recogni-
tion of an exclusive right to the fishery. Fairgrieve J. found the band 
had a constitutional priority over other users, but were not putting 
forward any kind of exclusive claim.69 The quota infringed the right 
but was deemed to have a valid conservation objective. The Saugeen 
Ojibway priority came into effect after the conservation objectives 
were met. The quota system, as applied by the Government, 
favoured all other users before the Ojibway. The trial judge also 
found that there was no consultation with the Chippewas over the 
66 [1993] O.J. No. 164 (C.A.) (QL). 
67 (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 421, [1993] 3 C.N.L.R. 182 (Prov. Ct.). 
68 Ibid. at 441. 
69 Ibid. at 434. The case leaves the impression that the Crown may have been fear-
mongering or succumbing to the same. 
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quota system.7° As a result, the regulations were found to be of no 
force or effect, and the accused were acquitted. 
Obviously, this case opens the door to other Native peoples liv-
ing under treaty to seek recognition in the courts of the right to a 
commercial fishery. The language used in this particular treaty is 
common to many of the numbered treaties.71 
The Government of Ontario has decided not to appeal the de-
cision, declaring that any appeal would likely fail. The Provincial 
Attorney General said that it was in the public interest to negotiate 
rather than use costly, time-consuming litigation to settle such is-
sues.72 The Minister of Natural Resources said that those who want 
the Government to regulate Natives in a "tougher manner" and use 
the courts to oppose Aboriginal rights are still in a "denial stage."73 
Subsequent to these remarks, the Province established a resource 
centre to collect data for efficient fisheries management. The pri-
mary goal conservation management. Secondarily, it is hoped that 
this signals the end of acrimony and court battles and the beginning 
of meaningful negotiation and cooperation. Government, Native 
and non-Aboriginal commercial fishery workers, anglers, conserva-
tion groups, and tourist operators will all be involved in the pro-
cess.74 
IV. CONCLUSION 
At the time of contact with Europeans, most indigenous nations 
were completely self-sufficient and maintained a complex web of 
economic, religious, and social customs in concert with the envi-
ronment. This relationship was severely disrupted by the newcom-
7o Ibid. at 448-53. 
7! The Treaties commonly use the phrase, "And further, Her Majesty agrees that 
her said Indians shall have the right to pursue their avocation of hunting, trapping 
and fishing throughout the tract surrendered, subject to such regulation as may 
from time to time be made by the Government of the country acting under the 
authority of Her Majesty, and save and excepting such tracts as may be required or 
taken up from time to time for settlement, mining or other purposes under grant, 
or other right given by Her Majesty's said Government." Such clauses will, as was 
done here, be read in light of Sparrow, Sioui, and the Constitution. 
72 Canadian Press (Toronto) (21May21 1993) (QL). 
73 Ibid. 
74 This announcement was made a scant two months after Fairgrieve J.'s decision. 
Canadian Press (Toronto) (21 June 21 1993) (QL). 
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ers. The imposition of a capitalist market economy and the whole-
sale derogation of the environment have wreaked havoc with the 
ability of indigenous peoples to maintain their original economic 
independence. 
It is absurd to suggest that constitutional recognition and affir-
mation of Aboriginal and Treaty rights is intended to limit those 
rights to merely subsistence levels. Simply because indigenous soci-
eties lacked a market in its current form does not mean that there 
was an absence of an economic aspect to their lives. Entry into the 
modern marketplace is in keeping with decision in Sparrow that 
rights evolve and are not to be frozen in time. 
For groups whose entire culture was built around the salmon, 
such as many of the British Columbia Nations, or who combined 
fishing and hunting as the mainstay of their society, as did the 
Mi'kmaq, it seems only too obvious that their rights have an essen-
tial commercial facet. Governments and the larger society must 
come to grips with this reality and accept that accommodations are 
to be made in the current system. 
The process that the Supreme Court began in Calder is far from 
finished. Across the entire country, Governments and Aboriginal 
groups are engaged in battles over the extent and meaning of all 
forms of Aboriginal rights. Amongst these are many court cases 
concerning the right to participate in a commercial fishery. 
The fiduciary responsibility placed on the Crown in its dealings 
with indigenous peoples requires that honourable and sensible steps 
be taken to resolve these issues outside of the courts. As the 
Government of Ontario said following Jones and Nadjiwon, it is a 
waste of time and money to continue this perpetual litigation. In 
addition, continuous legal wrangling fosters ill-will and racism in 
the larger community. Governments must begin to act responsibly 
and honestly represent the best interests of everyone concerned. 
Aboriginal groups must be given an opportunity to regain self-
sufficiency and contribute in a meaningful way to the economic 
and environmental health of the country. The Supreme Court has 
expressed its desire to see the process completed by negotiation and 
consultation. Few governments have responded fully. 
Nova Scotia, for example, has recognized that there needs to be 
a completely new approach taken in its dealings with the Mi'kmaq. 
The Premier has stated that negotiations will be conducted on a 
nation to nation basis, that mere recognition of Aboriginal rights is 
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not enough, and that due to past betrayal the Government must 
earn the trust of Natives.75 However, there is no coherent provincial 
policy regarding Aboriginal or Treaty rights to a commercial 
fishery, in spite of Governmental concern over the potential for vio-
lence in the disputed lobster fishery.76 
Frustrated by the lack of concrete Government action, many 
Natives have acted unilaterally to exercise their rights, or have 
launched court cases to force recognition of those rights. The re-
sponse of the lower courts to these actions has been mixed but gen-
erally conservatism reigns. 
Lambert J.A., of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, has laid 
out well considered guidelines on the meaning and extent of 
Aboriginal rights. It is his liberal interpretation that should govern 
application and implementation of those rights by governments. 
The statements in Guerin and Sparrow suggest he will be vindicated 
by the Supreme Court when it hears the relevant appeals. 
There is a great fear in the non-Native community that an 
Aboriginal right to the commercial fishery would be exercised as an 
exclusive right. Much of this fear is unfounded. As Fairgrieve J. 
found in Jones and Nadjiwon, there was not any demand for exclu-
siveness made. The Native Fishing Association has asked for a rea-
sonable thirty percent portion of the British Columbia fishery. 
Aboriginal people have a well-established history of sharing their 
wealth with others. As Elijah Harper has said, "As Indigenous peo-
ples we had no alternative but to fulfil our vision and intent to share 
the land and the resources with Europeans. We intended that the 
arrangement would be to respect and support each other."77 This 
has not been reciprocated. Colonialism, domination, abuse, and 
gross neglect have characterized the policies of this country's 
Governments. Change is long overdue: 
many of the non-native people who have come and 
talked will always tell us, if you Indians and you half-
breeds would begin to go to work and earn some money, 
you would be like us. They say, we came here and we 
75 From a statement made to the 19th General Assembly of the Native Council of 
Nova Scotia by Premier John Savage October 2, 1993. 
76 P. Underwood, Nova Scotia Deputy Minister of Fisheries, "Discussion of 
Nova Scotia Provincial Fisheries Policies" (Address at Dalhousie Law School, 10 
March 1994) [unpublished]. 
77 E. Harper (Address at Dalhousie Law School, 11 March 1994) [unpublished]. 
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had nothing when we came here, but look at us now. But 
my answer back to those people is always yes, you had 
nothing and many of you people came from countries 
where there was oppression, where you were forced to 
leave because you did not like the system. And when you 
came to this country, you came with nothing. So where 
did you find the riches? You found them right here, right 
here in Canada. The resources that made people rich are 
right here in Canada. We feel that those resources are 
ours, and we want to share in those resources, so we can 
participate in the economy of this country and the 
democracy of this country. And you cannot tell me that 
democracy works if you do not have some sort of eco-
nomic back-up in terms of our people being self-support-
ing. 78 
The Future? 
There remains the issue of implementing an Aboriginal right to a 
commercial fishery. In what order of priority will such access to the 
fishery be set? The cases discussed above have declared that the 
needs of conservation are to come first. Other valid government 
objectives may fit into the scheme at various places dependent upon 
their weight. Aboriginals exercising food and ceremonial rights 
come before all other users. 
A Native commercial fishery would likely fall below the food 
and ceremonial rights and ahead of recreational fishing. Balancing 
the rights and needs of non-native commercial fishers with indige-
nous rights will be problematic. Much care will have to be taken by 
Government to meet its fiduciary duty to Natives while attempting 
to maintain credibility in the larger community. There is also the 
very real threat of violence to consider. 
Wide-ranging and inclusive negotiations are vital if any process 
is to be successful. A co-management scheme would work best, ap-
portioning the fishery in line with the needs of individual commu-
nities. Aboriginal peoples have, as discussed earlier, a moral impera-
tive to share resources. They are open to sensible solutions. 
78 Statement made by Jim Sinclair before a Special Joint Committee of the 
Senate and House of Commons on the 1987 Constitutional Accord, quoted by 
Binnie, supra note 8 at 218. 
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Some non-natives presently engaged in the commercial fishery 
may choose to be "bought out." Some First Nations may elect 
compensation for the surrender of their claims. Neither of these 
options are likely. 
The Supreme Court has offered a potential answer to the ques-
tion in a recent case, Quebec (A.G.) v. Canada (National Energy 
Board).79 The Court voiced its opinion that the fiduciary duty owed 
by the Government to Aboriginal peoples operates less stringently 
when a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal is involved: 
The courts must be careful not to compromise the inde-
pendence of quasi-judicial tribunals and decision-making 
agencies by imposing upon them fiduciary obligations 
which require that their decisions be made in accordance 
with a fiduciary duty. 80 
Following wide-ranging and meaningful consultation with all inter-
ested parties it would be possible to create a tribunal similar to the 
present Labour Boards across the country. Ideally, this new body 
would be a tripartite group, constituted of representatives from 
Government, Aboriginal groups, and the fishing industry. It would 
be charged with administration of any agreement worked out by 
the consultation process. 
This country has a demonstrated ability to employ the concept 
of cooperative federalism which involves sharing the constitutional 
responsibilities of the Federal and Provincial Governments. It is ac-
complished through complementary legislation and often through 
delegation of powers to administrative boards. It should not be too 
difficult to include Indigenous peoples within this process immedi-
ately. It is time to end a history that reeks of acrimony, paternal-
ism, and arrogance. 
79 [1994] S.C.J. No. 13, S.C.C. File No. 22705 (QL). 
80 Ibid. para. 34. 
